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Thin trading, limited short-positions and curbed limit authorisations are regular 
characteristics of August holiday periods, ensuring that capital and financial markets are 
susceptible to excessive bouts of volatility. These factors, coupled with junior traders’ often 
peripheral knowledge of key emerging markets can result in significant speculative pressure 
against specific currencies. 
This year however, the usual seasonal factors have been exacerbated by adverse political 
factors and easing economic conditions. In terms of output prospects, with the notable 
exception of the United States, apparently benefitting from President Trump’s stimulus 
package, there is evidence of weakening performance and dampening market sentiments. 
Furthermore, it would be an understatement to suggest that the global trade, financial and 
diplomatic architecture is having profound difficulties accommodating the brusqueness of 
Trump’s diplotweets. Not only have the G7, WTO and assorted international groupings 
come under critique but individual states subjected to apparent sanctions by twitter – the 
latest being Turkey. 
The apparent intention by the United States to impose punitive sanctions against Turkish-
originated steel and aluminium imports, on ostensibly political grounds, has come at critical 
juncture when international investors have been re-assessing the medium-term credit-
worthiness of the Eurasian Republic. Not only has President Erdogan pursued an 
increasingly authoritarian government approach in the aftermath of the 2016 unsuccessful 
coup attempt, but also fiscal discipline was eroded in the approach to this year’s 
Presidential election (which saw Turkey revert to an Executive Presidency, abandoning the 
primacy of the Grand National Assembly, the Parliament). With inflation mounting, at 
15.85% y-o-y in August, it is at is highest level since the first quarter of 2004, and there are 
concerns that an economy prone to hyperinflation in the past (it peaked at 105% in 1994 
and 111% in previously in 1980) could be entering a new period of acute price pressures. 
Orthodox monetary policy would indicate that interest rate tightening would be an option 
to curb such pressures, however the President has suggested that he sees hiking interest 
rates, currently at 17.75%, as stimulating rather than eroding inflationary pressures. This 
policy stance exacerbated speculative currency movements, with the Turkish Lira falling to a 
record low of 7.2149 against the US$ last Monday. Although the currency recovered over 
the course of the week, trading at 6.1710 by Friday, this was largely a result of the central 
bank tightening monetary policy via regulatory (curbing swaps and forwards) and reserve 
requirement (for domestic financial institutions) adjustments. Past chronologies of emerging 
market currency crises would suggest that recourse to an IMF stabilisation package will be 
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required, especially given the Republic’s estimated US$220 billion in external financing 
requirements this year. However, Erdogan seems ideologically opposed to accepting IMF 
conditionality in principle, and appears to have made overtures to Russia, China and Qatar 
to secure replacement financing – with Qatar already willing to provide an immediate US$15 
billion. Whether such alternative sources can provide sufficient funding remains open to 
question, and in the absence of an approach to the IMF, it may prove that Turkey may 
establish a currency board to effect management of the Lira. 
With an economy equivalent to 1% of global GDP, Turkish instability is having a wider 
impact on emerging markets. With volatility at enhanced levels, the Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch emerging markets currency indicators are at volatility peaks not recorded since the 
global financial crisis (2008) and China’s WTO accession (2002). Whilst a range of currencies 
have come under pressure, Turkey is nevertheless only one factor, with US monetary policy 
tightening and the potential unwinding of QE adding to the shift in portfolio emphasis 
toward safe havens such as the US$, Swiss Franc and Japanese Yen. Although Turkey can 
expect some respite as a result of next week’s public holidays, in the absence of any 
meaningful reconciliation with Washington (which is again suggesting it may impose further 
sanctions) it may prove unlikely until after Turkish local elections early next year. 
Accordingly, contagion fears may not simply be confined to emerging markets, with EU 
banks exposed to any deterioration in Turkey’s capacity to service its public and private 
external financial obligations. Italy (with its own domestic non-performing loan problems), 
Spain and France are seen as vulnerable. It does, however, seem that Turkey will be unable 
to avoid a credit downgrade. 
The Turkish crisis highlights the complexity of international relations and alliances.  As a 
member of the EU Customs Union EU member states may, although not obliged to, feel the 
need to support Turkey in its trade conflict with the US, notwithstanding their concern over 
Erdogan’s domestic policies.  This is something the German government may be edging 
toward.  While Qatar’s support of Turkey, when it is in current conflict with other Gulf states 
led by Saudi Arabia, places US alliances in the Arabian Peninsula in potential jeopardy.  More 
broadly, Trump’s somewhat cavalier approach to NATO throws the whole post-war system 
into question. 
Against this backdrop of international market instability, Britain continues to prevaricate on 
its preferred option for exiting the EU, with the EU seemingly becoming more intransigent in 
its positions. Indeed, rather than it being simply a choice between reaching a mutually 
agreed exit strategy and a so-called “No Deal” exit on WTO terms, there is increasing 
speculation that there is a third solution, namely leaving without reconciling WTO 
arrangements, legal or physically, beforehand. The ratings agency Fitch has recently raised 
the probability of a problematic difficult exit. 
 
